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EDITORIAL 
This issue of the IJMHCL is the third since the journal was relaunched in 2016.  Since 
that time, the journal has received a steady stream of excellent submissions on mental 
health and/or mental capacity law from authors in various jurisdictions.  
The intersection of mental health and mental capacity laws is at the heart of Emma 
Cave and Jacinta Tan’s article, ‘Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the Court 
of Protection in England and Wales’. The article outlines the clinical uncertainties 
associated with prognosis and treatment of severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa 
(SEAN). In five recent cases, the Court of Protection in England and Wales has been 
asked to consider the capacity and best interests of patients with severe and enduring 
Anorexia Nervosa.  The article recommends that the courts adopt a patient-centred 
rather than clinician-centred approach to framing the decision that is subject to a 
capacity assessment. Where a patient with Anorexia Nervosa lacks capacity, reliance 
on their stated treatment preferences should be balanced with their views and hopes 
regarding prognosis. The value of different treatment options should be assessed in 
this light. The article warns that, given the clinical and ethical uncertainties regarding 
prognosis and appropriateness of treatment, there are dangers in relying on the same 
court-appointed expert in all cases.  Kris Gledhill was the editor for this article.    
The effects of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities continue 
to extend across several jurisdictions. Katerina Kazou considers the definition of 
disability in the CRPD in her article, ‘Analysing the Definition of Disability in the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Is it Really Based on a “Social 
Model” Approach?’  The article argues that the definition of disability in the CRPD is 
closer to the definition provided in WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICF) than it is to the ‘social model’ of disability. The ICF 
understands disability as the multi-dimensional and interactive experience of a wide 
range of difficulties in functioning. In particular, these difficulties include impairments, 
limitations in performing activities and restrictions in participating in life situations, and 
arise out of the complex interaction between health conditions, personal factors and 
barriers in the physical and social environment. Kazou believes there could be positive 
effects in associating the CRPD with the ICF, as it can avoid the criticism faced by the 
‘social model’ for its limitations, especially for considering impairment as being entirely 
irrelevant to the experience of disability. At the same time, the valuable insights of the 
‘social model’ regarding the disabling effect of social and environmental barriers can 
be retained, but without ignoring the relevance of impairment to the experience of 
disability or minimising the health needs of persons with disabilities.  
In his article ‘Negotiating Relationality: Mental Capacity as Narrative Congruence’, 
David Gibson argues that the concept of capacity that emerges from the Mental 
Capacity Act (2005) is conceptually flawed and places practitioners in an impossible 
situation regarding its application. He believes that the continued support by the UK 
government and others for the Act strengthens the idea that the capacity/incapacity 
distinction is natural and that incapacity is an intrapsychic feature of an individual. The 
paper proposes an alternative model for understanding capacity and its assessment 
based on a narrative theory that recognises the role of the practitioner and identity 
negotiation. The paper includes three principles of a narrative theory of capacity 
assessment: 
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i) Mental Capacity determinations are judgements arising from and sometimes relating to an
individual’s personal identity but always in a relational dynamic.  
ii) What is assessed in mental capacity determinations is the congruence between the narrative
account of events or behaviours of the assessor and the assessed. 
iii) The impetus to assess capacity begins where alternative accounts that can lead to narrative
conflict are shared with or identified by an assessor of capacity. 
In his article, ‘Some Continental European Perspectives on Safeguards in the Case of 
Deprivation of Liberty in Health and Social Care Settings’, Walter Boente addresses a 
dearth of comparative academic literature on deprivation of liberty in health and care 
settings across Europe. His article reviews relevant laws in Germany, Switzerland, 
France, Austria and Spain.  He notes that there is a trend to emphasise the role of the 
judge, or at least an independent person, but there is no consensus as to whether the 
judge should play a role in the admission or control process. The judge does not 
replace the medical experts, but is considered a neutral, independent expert in 
supervising the decision making process. Boente notes that the impression remains 
that the continental European systems are based on a historically founded, objective, 
or sometimes paternalistic, perspective on deprivation of liberty. There might be 
differences between national laws, for example in their use of private or public law 
mechanisms, regarding the appointment of a representative for the person concerned, 
or even on the amount of information which the person must receive, but the systems 
remain patchwork, taking the wrong starting point. One outcome is that continental 
legislation struggles to address the requirements of the CRPD.     
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